Here is a translation of the lecture given in Italian by Cardinal Joseph
Ratzinger, now Benedict XIV, in the convent of Saint Scholastica in Subiaco,
Italy, the day before Pope John Paul II died.
are living in a time of great dangers and great opportunities for man and the
world; a time which is also of great responsibility for us all. During the past
century man's possibilities and his dominion over matter grew by truly
unthinkable measures. However, his power to dispose of the world has been such
as to allow his capacity for destruction to reach dimensions which at times
horrify us. In this connection, the threat of terrorism comes spontaneously to
mind, this new war without boundaries or fronts.
The fear that it might soon get a hold of nuclear or biological weapons is not
unfounded, and has made it necessary for lawful states to adopt internal
security systems similar to those that previously existed only in dictatorships.
The feeling remains, nevertheless, that, in reality, all these precautions are
not enough, as a global control is neither possible nor desirable.
Less visible, but no less disquieting, are the possibilities of
self-manipulation that man has acquired. He has plumbed the depths of being, has
deciphered the components of the human being, and is now capable, so to speak,
of constructing man himself, who thus no longer comes into the world as a gift
of the Creator, but as a product of our action, a product that, therefore, can
also be selected according to the exigencies established by ourselves.
Thus, the splendor of being an image of God no longer shines over man, which is
what confers on him his dignity and inviolability, and he is left only to the
power of his own human capacities. He is no more than the image of man of what
To this are added the great global problems: inequality in the distribution of
the goods of the earth, growing poverty, and the more threatening impoverishment
and exhaustion of the earth and its resources, hunger, sicknesses that threaten
the whole world and the clash of cultures.
All this shows that the growth of our possibilities has not been matched by a
comparable development of our moral energy. Moral strength has not grown
together with the development of science; rather, it has diminished, because the
technical mentality relegates morality to the subjective realm, while we have
need, precisely, of a public morality, a morality that is able to respond to the
threats that weigh down on the existence of us all. The real and gravest danger
in these times lies, precisely, in this imbalance between technical
possibilities and moral energy.
The security we need as a precondition of our freedom and our dignity cannot
come, in the last analysis, from technical systems of control, but can,
specifically, spring only from man's moral strength: Whenever the latter is
lacking or is insufficient, the power man has will be transformed increasingly
into a power of destruction.
A new moralism
It is true that a new moralism exists today whose key words are justice, peace
and conservation of creation — words that call for essential moral values of
which we are in real need. But this moralism remains vague and thus slides,
almost inevitably, into the political-party sphere. It is above all a dictum
addressed to others, and too little a personal duty of our daily life. In fact,
what does justice mean? Who defines it? What serves towards peace?
Over the last decades we have amply seen in our streets and squares how pacifism
can deviate toward a destructive anarchism and terrorism. The political moralism
of the 70s, the roots of which are anything but dead, was a moralism that
succeeded in attracting even young people full of ideals. But it was a moralism
with a mistaken direction, in as much as it was deprived of serene rationality
and because, in the last analysis, it placed the political utopia above the
dignity of the individual man, showing itself even capable of arriving at
contempt for man in the name of great objectives.
Political moralism, as we have lived it and are still living it, does not open
the way to regeneration, and even more, also blocks it. The same is true,
consequently, also for a Christianity and a theology that reduces the heart of
Jesus' message, the "kingdom of God," to the "values of the kingdom,"
identifying these values with the great key words of political moralism, and
proclaiming them, at the same time, as a synthesis of the religions.
Nonetheless, God is neglected in this way, notwithstanding the fact that it is
precisely he who is the subject and cause of the kingdom of God. In his stead,
great words (and values) remain, which lend themselves to all kinds of abuse.
This brief look at the situation of the world leads us to reflect on today's
situation of Christianity and, therefore, on the foundations of Europe; that
Europe which at one time, we can say, was the Christian continent, but which was
also the starting point of that new scientific rationality which has given us
great possibilities, as well as great threats. Christianity, it is true, did not
start in Europe, and therefore it cannot even be classified as a European
religion, the religion of the European cultural realm. But it received precisely
in Europe its most effective cultural and intellectual imprint and remains,
therefore, identified in a special way with Europe.
Furthermore, it is also true that this Europe, since the time of the
Renaissance, and in a fuller sense since the time of the Enlightenment, has
developed precisely that scientific rationality which not only in the era of the
discoveries led to the geographic unity of the world, to the meeting of
continents and cultures, but which today, much more profoundly, thanks to the
technical culture made possible by science, imprints itself on the whole world,
and even more than that, in a certain sense, gives it uniformity.
And in the wake of this form of rationality, Europe has developed a culture
that, in a manner unknown before now to humanity, excludes God from the public
conscience, either by denying him altogether, or by judging that his existence
is not demonstrable, uncertain and, therefore, belonging to the realm of
subjective choices, something, in any case, irrelevant to public life.
This purely functional rationality, so to speak, has implied a disorder of the
moral conscience altogether new for cultures existing up to now, as it deems
rational only that which can be proved with experiments. As morality belongs to
an altogether different sphere, it disappears as a category unto itself and must
be identified in another way, in as much as it must be admitted, in any case,
that morality is essential.
who in this respect are often and willingly brought in, do not feel
threatened by our Christian moral foundations, but by the cynicism of a
secularized culture that denies its own foundations. ... The same is
true for the reference to God: It is not the mention of God that offends
those who belong to other religions, but rather the attempt to build the
human community absolutely without God.
a world based on calculation, it is the calculation of consequences that
determines what must or must not be considered moral. And thus the category of
the good, as was clearly pointed out by Kant, disappears. Nothing is good or bad
in itself, everything depends on the consequences that an action allows one to
If Christianity, on one hand, has found its most effective form in Europe, it is
necessary, on the other hand, to say that in Europe a culture has developed that
constitutes the absolutely most radical contradiction not only of Christianity,
but of the religious and moral traditions of humanity.
From this, one understands that Europe is experiencing a true and proper "test
of tension"; from this, one also understands the radicalism of the tensions that
our continent must face. However from this emerges also, and above all, the
responsibility that we Europeans must assume at this historical moment in the
debate on the definition of Europe, on its new political shape. It is not a
question of a nostalgic rearguard battle of history being played out, but rather
a great responsibility for today's humanity.
Let us take a closer look at this opposition between the two cultures that have
characterized Europe. In the debate on the Preamble of the European
Constitution, this opposition was seen in two controversial points: the question
of the reference to God in the Constitution and the mention of the Christian
roots of Europe. Given that in article 52 of the Constitution the institutional
rights of Churches are guaranteed, we can be at peace, it is said.
But this means that in the life of Europe, the Churches find a place in the
realm of the political commitment, while, in the realm of the foundations of
Europe, the imprint of their content has no place. The reasons that are given in
the public debate for this clear "no" are superficial, and it is obvious that
more than indicating the real motivation, they conceal it. The affirmation that
the mention of the Christian roots of Europe injures the sentiments of many
non-Christians who are in Europe, is not very convincing, given that it relates,
first of all, to an historical fact that no one can seriously deny.
Naturally, this historical mention has a reference to the present. To mention
the roots implies indicating as well the residual sources of moral orientation,
which is a factor of Europe's identity. Who would be offended? Whose identity is
The Muslims, who in this respect are often and willingly brought in, do not feel
threatened by our Christian moral foundations, but by the cynicism of a
secularized culture that denies its own foundations. Neither are our Jewish
fellow citizens offended by the reference to the Christian roots of Europe, in
as much as these roots go back to Mount Sinai: They bear the sign of the voice
that made itself heard on the mountain of God and unite with us in the great
fundamental orientations that the Decalogue has given humanity. The same is true
for the reference to God: It is not the mention of God that offends those who
belong to other religions, but rather the attempt to build the human community
absolutely without God.
The motivations of this twofold "no" are more profound than one would think from
the reasons offered. They presuppose the idea that only the radical
Enlightenment culture, which has reached its full development in our time, could
be constitutive for European identity. Next to this culture, then, different
religious cultures can coexist with their respective rights, on the condition
and to the degree in which they respect the criteria of the Enlightenment
culture, and are subordinated to it.
Culture of rights
This Enlightenment culture is essentially defined by the rights of freedom; it
stems from freedom as a fundamental value that measures everything: the freedom
of religious choice, which includes the religious neutrality of the state;
freedom to express one's own opinion, as long as it does not cast doubt
specifically on this canon; the democratic ordering of the state, that is,
parliamentary control on state organisms; the free formation of parties; the
independence of the judiciary; and, finally, the safeguarding of the rights of
man and the prohibition of discriminations. Here the canon is still in the
process of formation, given that there are also rights of man that are in
opposition, as for example, in the case of the conflict between a woman's desire
for freedom and the right of the unborn to live.
The concept of discrimination is ever more extended, and so the prohibition of
discrimination can be increasingly transformed into a limitation of the freedom
of opinion and religious liberty. Very soon it will not be possible to state
that homosexuality, as the Catholic Church teaches, is an objective disorder in
the structuring of human existence. And the fact that the Church is convinced of
not having the right to confer priestly ordination on women is considered by
some up to now as something irreconcilable with the spirit of the European
It is evident that this canon of the Enlightenment culture, less than
definitive, contains important values which we, precisely as Christians, do not
want and cannot renounce; however, it is also obvious that the ill-defined or
undefined concept of freedom, which is at the base of this culture, inevitably
entails contradictions; and it is obvious that precisely because of its use (a
use that seems radical) it has implied limitations of freedom that a generation
ago we could not even imagine. A confused ideology of freedom leads to
dogmatism, which is showing itself increasingly hostile to freedom.
We must, without a doubt, focus again on the question of the internal
contradictions of the present form of the Enlightenment culture. But we must
first finish describing it. It is part of its nature, in so far as culture of a
reason that, finally, has complete awareness of itself, to boast a universal
pretense and conceive itself as complete in itself, not in need of some
completion through other cultural factors.
Both these characteristics are clearly seen when the question is posed about who
can become a member of the European community and, above all, in the debate
about Turkey's entry into this community. It is a question of a state, or
perhaps better, of a cultural realm, which does not have Christian roots, but
which was influenced by the Islamic culture. Then, Ataturk tried to transform
Turkey into a secular state, attempting to implant in Muslim terrain the
secularism that had matured in the Christian world of Europe.
We can ask ourselves if that is possible. According to the thesis of the
Enlightenment and secular culture of Europe, only the norms and contents of the
Enlightenment culture will be able to determine Europe's identity and,
consequently, every state that makes these criteria its own, will be able to
belong to Europe. It does not matter, in the end, on what plot of roots this
culture of freedom and democracy is implanted.
And, precisely because of this, it is affirmed, that the roots cannot enter into
the definition of the foundations of Europe, it being a question of dead roots
that are not part of the present identity. As a consequence, this new identity,
determined exclusively by the Enlightenment culture, also implies that God does
not come in at all into public life and the foundations of the state.
...it is also
obvious that the ill-defined or undefined concept of freedom, which is
at the base of this culture, inevitably entails contradictions; and it
is obvious that precisely because of its use (a use that seems radical)
it has implied limitations of freedom that a generation ago we could not
even imagine. A confused ideology of freedom leads to dogmatism, which
is showing itself increasingly hostile to freedom.
Thus everything becomes logical and also, in some sense, plausible. In fact,
what could we desire as being more beautiful than knowing that everywhere
democracy and human rights are respected? Nevertheless, the question must be
asked, if this secular Enlightenment culture is really the culture, finally
proposed as universal, that can give a common cause to all men; a culture that
should have access from everywhere, even though it is on a humus that is
historically and culturally differentiated. And we also ask ourselves if it is
really complete in itself, to the degree that it has no need of a root outside
Let us address these last two questions. To the first, that is, to the question
as to whether a universally valid philosophy has been reached which is finally
wholly scientifically rational, which expresses the cause common to all men, we
must respond that undoubtedly we have arrived at important acquisitions which
can pretend to a universal validity. These include: the acquisition that
religion cannot be imposed by the state, but that it can only be accepted in
freedom; respect of the fundamental rights of man equal for all; the separation
of powers and control of power.
It cannot be thought, however, that these fundamental values, recognized by us
as generally valid, can be realized in the same way in every historical context.
Not all societies have the sociological assumptions for a democracy based on
parties, as occurs in the West; therefore, the total religious neutrality of the
state, in the majority of historical contexts, has to be considered an illusion.
And so we come to the problems raised by the second question. But let us clarify
first if the modern Enlightenment philosophies, considered as a whole, can
contain the last word of the cause common to all men. These philosophies are
characterized by the fact that they are positivist and, therefore,
anti-metaphysical, so much so that, in the end, God cannot have any place in
them. They are based on the self-limitation of rational positivism, which can be
applied in the technical realm, but which when it is generalized, entails
instead a mutilation of man. It succeeds in having man no longer admit any moral
claim beyond his calculations and, as we saw, the concept of freedom, which at
first glance would seem to extend in an unlimited manner, in the end leads to
the self-destruction of freedom.
It is true that the positivist philosophies contain important elements of truth.
However, these are based on imposed limitations of reason, characteristic of a
specific cultural situation that of the modern West and therefore not the last
word of reason. Nevertheless though they might seem totally rational, they are
not the voice of reason itself, but are also identified culturally with the
present situation in the West.
For this reason they are in no way that philosophy which one day could be valid
throughout the world. But, above all, it must be said that this Enlightenment
philosophy, and its respective culture, is incomplete. It consciously severs its
own historical roots depriving itself of the regenerating forces from which it
sprang, from that fundamental memory of humanity, so to speak, without which
reason loses its orientation.
Knowing is doing
In fact, the principle is now valid, according to which, man's capacity is
measured by his action. What one knows how to do, may also be done. There no
longer exists a knowing how to do separated from a being able to do, because it
would be against freedom, which is the absolute supreme value. But man knows how
to do many things, and knows increasingly how to do more things; and if this
knowing how to do does not find its measure in a moral norm, it becomes, as we
can already see, a power of destruction.
Man knows how to clone men, and so he does it. Man knows how to use men as a
store of organs for other men, and so he does it; he does it because this seems
to be an exigency of his freedom. Man knows how to construct atomic bombs and so
he makes them, being, in line of principle, also disposed to use them. In the
end, terrorism is also based on this modality of man's self-authorization, and
not on the teachings of the Koran.
The radical detachment of the Enlightenment philosophy from its roots becomes,
in the last analysis, contempt for man. Man, deep down, has no freedom, we are
told by the spokesmen of the natural sciences, in total contradiction with the
starting point of the whole question. Man must not think that he is something
more than all other living beings and, therefore, should also be treated like
them, we are told by even the most advanced spokesmen of a philosophy clearly
separated from the roots of humanity's historical memory.
We asked ourselves two questions: if rationalist (positivist) philosophy is
strictly rational and, consequently, if it is universally valid, and if it is
complete. Is it self-sufficient? Can it, or more directly must it, relegate its
historical roots to the realm of the pure past and, therefore, to the realm of
what can only be valid subjectively?
We must respond to both questions with a definitive "no." This philosophy does
not express man's complete reason, but only a part of it, and because of this
mutilation of reason it cannot be considered entirely rational. For this reason
it is incomplete, and can only be fulfilled by re-establishing contact with its
roots. A tree without roots dries up.
By stating this, one does not deny all that is positive and important of this
philosophy, but one affirms rather its need to complete itself, its profound
deficiency. And so we must again address the two controversial points of the
Preamble of the European Constitution. The banishment of Christian roots does
not reveal itself as the expression of a higher tolerance, which respects all
cultures in the same way, not wishing to privilege any, but rather as the
absolutizing of a pattern of thought and of life that are radically opposed,
among other things, to the other historical cultures of humanity.
The real opposition that characterizes today's world is not that between various
religious cultures, but that between the radical emancipation of man from God,
from the roots of life, on one hand, and from the great religious cultures on
the other. If there were to be a clash of cultures, it would not be because of a
clash of the great religions which have always struggled against one another,
but which, in the end, have also always known how to live with one another but
it will be because of the clash between this radical emancipation of man and the
great historical cultures.
Thus, even the rejection of the reference to God, is not the expression of a
tolerance that desires to protect the non-theistic religions and the dignity of
atheists and agnostics, but rather the expression of a conscience that would
like to see God cancelled definitively from the public life of humanity, and
relegated to the subjective realm of residual cultures of the past.
Relativism, which is the starting point of all this, thus becomes a dogmatism
which believes itself to be in possession of the definitive scope of reason, and
with the right to regard all the rest only as a stage of humanity, in the end
surmounted, and that can be appropriately relativized. In reality, this means
that we have need of roots to survive, and that we must not lose sight of God,
if we do not want human dignity to disappear.
The Permanent Significance of the Christian Faith
Is this a simple rejection of the Enlightenment and of modernity? Absolutely
not. From the beginning, Christianity has understood itself as the religion of
the "Logos," as the religion according to reason. In the first place, it has not
identified its precursors in the other religions, but in that philosophical
enlightenment which has cleared the path of traditions to turn to the search of
the truth and towards the good, toward the one God who is above all gods.
connection, the Enlightenment is of Christian origin and it is no
accident that it was born precisely and exclusively in the realm of the
so far as religion of the persecuted, in so far as universal religion, beyond
the different states and peoples, it has denied the state the right to regard
religion as a part of state ordering, thus postulating the freedom of faith. It
has always defined men, all men without distinction, as creatures and images of
God, proclaiming for them, in terms of principle, although within the imperative
limits of social ordering, the same dignity.
In this connection, the Enlightenment is of Christian origin and it is no
accident that it was born precisely and exclusively in the realm of the
Christian faith, whenever Christianity, against its nature and unfortunately,
had become tradition and religion of the state. Notwithstanding the philosophy,
in so far as search for rationality also of our faith, was always a prerogative
of Christianity, the voice of reason had been too domesticated.
It was and is the merit of the Enlightenment to have again proposed these
original values of Christianity and of having given back to reason its own
voice. In the pastoral constitution, On the Church in the Modern World, Vatican
Council II underlined again this profound correspondence between Christianity
and the Enlightenment, seeking to come to a true conciliation between the Church
and modernity, which is the great heritage that both sides must defend.
Given all this, it is necessary that both sides engage in self-reflection and be
willing to correct themselves. Christianity must always remember that it is the
religion of the "Logos." It is faith in the "Creator Spiritus," in the Creator
Spirit, from which proceeds everything that exists. Today, this should be
precisely its philosophical strength, in so far as the problem is whether the
world comes from the irrational, and reason is not, therefore, other than a
"sub-product," on occasion even harmful of its development or whether the world
comes from reason, and is, as a consequence, its criterion and goal.
The Christian faith inclines toward this second thesis, thus having, from the
purely philosophical point of view, really good cards to play, despite the fact
that many today consider only the first thesis as the only modern and rational
one par excellence. However, a reason that springs from the irrational, and that
is, in the final analysis, itself irrational, does not constitute a solution for
our problems. Only creative reason, which in the crucified God is manifested as
love, can really show us the way. In the so necessary dialogue between
secularists and Catholics, we Christians must be very careful to remain faithful
to this fundamental line: to live a faith that comes from the "Logos," from
creative reason, and that, because of this, is also open to all that is truly
"As if God existed"
testimony of Christians who speak about God and live against him, has
darkened God's image and opened the door to disbelief. We need men who
have their gaze directed to God, to understand true humanity. We need
men whose intellects are enlightened by the light of God, and whose
hearts God opens, so that their intellects can speak to the intellects
of others, and so that their hearts are able to open up to the hearts of
But at this point, in my capacity as believer, I would like to make a proposal
to the secularists. At the time of the Enlightenment there was an attempt to
understand and define the essential moral norms, saying that they would be valid
"etsi Deus non daretur," even in the case that God did not exist. In the
opposition of the confessions and in the pending crisis of the image of God, an
attempt was made to keep the essential values of morality outside the
contradictions and to seek for them an evidence that would render them
independent of the many divisions and uncertainties of the different
philosophies and confessions. In this way, they wanted to ensure the basis of
coexistence and, in general, the foundations of humanity. At that time, it was
thought to be possible, as the great deep convictions created by Christianity to
a large extent remained. But this is no longer the case.
The search for such a reassuring certainty, which could remain uncontested
beyond all differences, failed. Not even the truly grandiose effort of Kant was
able to create the necessary shared certainty. Kant had denied that God could be
known in the realm of pure reason, but at the same time he had represented God,
freedom and immortality as postulates of practical reason, without which,
coherently, for him no moral behavior was possible.
Does not today's situation of the world make us think perhaps that he might have
been right? I would like to express it in a different way: The attempt, carried
to the extreme, to manage human affairs disdaining God completely leads us
increasingly to the edge of the abyss, to man's ever greater isolation from
reality. We must reverse the axiom of the Enlightenment and say: Even one who
does not succeed in finding the way of accepting God, should, nevertheless, seek
to live and to direct his life veluti si Deus daretur, as if God existed.
This is the advice Pascal gave to his friends who did not believe. In this way,
no one is limited in his freedom, but all our affairs find the support and
criterion of which they are in urgent need.
Above all, that of which we are in need at this moment in history are men who,
through an enlightened and lived faith, render God credible in this world. The
negative testimony of Christians who speak about God and live against him, has
darkened God's image and opened the door to disbelief. We need men who have
their gaze directed to God, to understand true humanity. We need men whose
intellects are enlightened by the light of God, and whose hearts God opens, so
that their intellects can speak to the intellects of others, and so that their
hearts are able to open up to the hearts of others.
Only through men who have been touched by God, can God come near to men. We need
men like Benedict of Norcia, who at a time of dissipation and decadence, plunged
into the most profound solitude, succeeding, after all the purifications he had
to suffer, to ascend again to the light, to return and to found Montecasino, the
city on the mountain that, with so many ruins, gathered together the forces from
which a new world was formed.
In this way Benedict, like Abraham, became the father of many nations. The
recommendations to his monks presented at the end of his "Rule" are guidelines
that show us also the way that leads on high, beyond the crisis and the ruins.
"Just as there is a bitter zeal that removes one from God and leads to hell, so
there is a good zeal that removes one from vices and leads to God and to eternal
life. It is in this zeal that monks must exercise themselves with most ardent
love: May they outdo one another in rendering each other honor, may they
support, in turn, with utmost patience their physical and moral infirmities ...
May they love one another with fraternal affection ... Fear God in love ... Put
absolutely nothing before Christ who will be able to lead all to eternal life"
This lecture took place April 1, 2005 when Cardinal Razinger received the St.
Benedict Award for the promotion of life and the family in Europe.
ZENIT is an International News Agency based in Rome whose mission is to provide
objective and professional coverage of events, documents and issues emanating
from or concerning the Catholic Church for a worldwide audience, especially the
Reprinted with permission from Zenit News from Rome. All rights reserved.